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NE OF THE MORE vexing questions about democracy that is often debated among political theorists, political scientists, and legal scholars is
whether the democratic character of mature democracies can be improved. From one view, that of democratic realists, mature democracies are perfected
as a matter of definition and as a matter of realistic
expectations. Because mature democracies are those
that respect core democratic principles, variations
outside the core are simply policy differences based
upon each democratic polity’s willingness to engage
in a different set of trade-offs. For democratic realists, variations in democratic practice that are not
related to core democratic principles do not in any
way call into question the democratic character of
the polity. From another view, that of democratic
perfectionists, even among mature democratic states
that share core democratic commitments, there exist electoral deficiencies that call into question the
democratic character of mature democracies. From
the perspective of democratic perfectionists, democracy is a continuum and not a binary condition of
either democratic or not. Given that democracy is a
more-or-less proposition (as opposed to either-or),
it makes sense to talk about perfecting mature
democracies as there is a normative ideal vision to
perfect toward.
In Rethinking American Electoral Democracy,
Matthew J. Streb, a political scientist at Northern
Illinois University, joins the debate more or less on
the side of the democracy perfectionists. The book
is a great and easy read. It moves through a lot of
material without being burdensome. Some of the ar-
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guments are quite provocative. The book would be
a great companion to any class on law and politics.
It is an important contribution to the field.
Rethinking American Electoral Democracy is organized in three parts. In Part I, Professor Streb focuses on factors that affect turnout and argues that
there are too many elections in the United States.
Part II addresses ballot access and vote counting.
There, Professor Streb argues for expansive ballot
access laws and comes out in favor of optical scan
voting machines. Part III explores broader national
questions including congressional redistricting, the
Electoral College, presidential primaries, and campaign finance reform. Professor Streb would like to
have more non-partisan redistricting commissions,
he is in favor of a national presidential primary, he
would eliminate the Electoral College, and he would
eliminate caps on campaign contributions.
Professor Streb states as his aim the articulation
of “the conditions of a model electoral democracy”
(2). This model is presented not as an unattainable
ideal against which to assess the democratic character of a polity that calls itself democratic, but as
setting forth realistic goals for a mature democracy
such as the United States. Some of the conditions
of Professor Streb’s model electoral democracy include what almost all parties to this debate would
agree are core commitments that ought to exist in
every democracy and that separate democratic from
non-democratic states. But they also include other
types of commitments, such as non-burdensome
electoral rules, about which there will be no consensus.
Though Professor Streb recognizes the contested
nature of some of the principles that he espouses, he
nevertheless views them as normative requirements.
This point highlights a peril for democratic perfectionists, as they have to convince us that their proposed trade-offs are more compelling than the sta-
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tus quo and they have to defend the normative underpinnings of their argument. Consider for example Professor Streb’s argument that campaign contribution limits should be eliminated entirely. This
conclusion is based upon the contention that the
problem of campaign financing is not that there is
too much money in American elections but that there
is too little (165). Professor Streb contends that if
caps were removed, more money would be available
to challengers, which would result in more competitive elections. This is because, he maintains, as an
empirical matter the competitiveness of an election
is determined not by the amount of money the incumbent spends but by the amount of money the
challenger spends. Thus, even though incumbents
would be able to also raise more money, because the
marginal utility of the contribution would be greater
to the challenger, permitting unlimited contributions
would naturally level the playing field.
But eliminating contribution caps would exacerbate a serious equality problem in American politics. Professor Streb unhelpfully responds that current campaign finance regulations do not guarantee
equality because “[f]ew people have the resources
to donate the $2,300 to one candidate, much less
multiple candidates” (168). It is true that few people can donate up to the current caps, so some level
of political inequality exists. Thus, if the goal of
campaign contribution caps is to eliminate political inequality, they have not done so. But if one
of the goals of contribution caps is to limit political inequality, Professor Streb’s point is inapposite.
Moreover, his proposal would seriously exacerbate this problem and raise political inequality
as a fundamental concern in American politics to
an extent that it is not currently. Does one believe
that politicians would not be disproportionately responsive to individuals and more problematically
corporations who could potentially contribute
hundreds of thousands of dollars each or who
could potentially bundle millions? To the extent
that political equality is currently not viewed as a
problem in American politics, this proposal would
assure that it is. To the extent that political equality is viewed as a problem, this proposal would
exacerbate it by orders of magnitude. Economic
inequality and political inequality would be mutually reinforcing forces in American politics with
very little to moderate their potentially disastrous
effects.

CHARLES

Professor Streb defends his recommendation on
the ground that it would make elections more competitive. This assertion is in tension with his earlier
definition of the competitiveness principle. As he
defines the concept, the goal is not that each election is competitive in order for the electoral system
to be legitimate; rather, the goal is that there must
be the potential for competitive elections (3–4).
Competition itself as a democratic value is ambiguous as a matter of definition. In its most controversial articulation, it instructs that the state
arranges democratic institutions to create, artificially if need be, as much competition as possible
by, for example, making all districts as competitive
as possible or by changing campaign finance rules
to make campaigns as competitive as possible. In
its more restrained articulation, it simply implies
that the state should not interfere with competitive
electoral structures where they might otherwise exist.1 Consistently with this narrower and less contested definition of the principle, theorists, including Professor Streb, have defined competitiveness
not as a goal but as a state. Thus, I have argued in
previous scholarship that elections ought to be contestable, but not subject to a normative requirement
that the state guarantee competitive elections.2 Professor Streb uses the phrase “potential” for competitive elections and Professor Kang, who has the
most comprehensive and sophisticated exposition of
this concept, uses “democratic contestation.”3
Under current campaign finance rules elections
are certainly contestable. That is, they are capable
of being competitive. To use Professor Streb’s
phrase, there is the potential for competition. The
state does not enforce one-party dominance or impose discriminatory burdens on challengers. Under
Professor Streb’s proposed change, elections must
be as competitive as possible and the state must assure that they are so in the manner in which it promulgates campaign finance rules. This requirement
of “as competitive as possible” is different from
“competitive potential.” Consequently, it compels a

1 See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, Competition and Competitiveness in American Elections, 6 ELECTION L. J. 278, 280
(2007).
2 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 OHIO STATE L. J. 1185, 1199 & n. 53 (2007).
3 See generally Michael Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L. J. 734 (2008).
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different justification, which Rethinking American
Electoral Democracy does not offer.
Some, if not most, of the other arguments advanced by Professor Streb are generally unobjectionable and one does not need to be a democratic
perfectionist to accept them. Take for example his
argument that the combination of frequent elections,
the consequence in part of decentralization in the
electoral process, and onerous voting rules make
voting too costly for the average citizen. Professor
Streb points out that too many states schedule multiple elections in a given year—Georgia had five
elections in one year—and many of these states have
burdensome voting administration rules. This contributes to extremely low turnout for low salience
and low information elections. His suggestions that
polities consolidate elections and reduce the number of elective offices seem quite sensible. Similarly, his argument that if states are going to use
direct democracy measures they should take rea-
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sonable steps regulating their use, such as limiting
the number of initiatives that can appear on the ballot, seems also quite sensible.
It is not clear to me that Rethinking American
Electoral Democracy will convince many people
that there is such an attainable state as a model
democracy. But Professor Streb has clearly succeeded in writing a thoughtful book with a plethora
of sometimes counterintuitive but always well-argued proposals for incrementally improving American democracy.
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